Abstract. The purpose of this article is to present a parametrised functional interpretation. Depending on the choice of the parameter relations one obtains well-known functional interpretations, such as Gödel's Dialectica interpretation, Diller-Nahm's variant of the Dialectica interpretation, Kohlenbach's monotone interpretations, Kreisel's modified realizability and Stein's family of functional interpretations. A functional interpretation consists of a formula translation and a proof translation. We show that all these interpretation only differ on two choices: firstly, on "how much" of the counterexamples for A became witnesses for ¬A when defining the formula translation, and, secondly, "how much" of the witnesses of A one is interested in when defining the proof translation.
Introduction
In [1] Gödel developed his Dialectica interpretation (also known as functional interpretation) with the goal of proving relative consistency of first-order arithmetic. The consistency of arithmetic was reduced to that of a quantifier-free calculus based on the language of finite types. He successfully showed that quantifier dependencies can be totally captured by functional dependency, so that logic is eliminated in favour of objects of higher types. Around the same time, Kreisel observed that such proof techniques give in fact much more than just relative conservation results. In the process of replacing logic by functionals, the interpretation automatically makes explicit information "hidden" in the logical structure of the proof. In [2] Kreisel then gives a clear presentation of Gödel's Dialectica interpretation and uses it to define the constructive truth of mathematical theorems.
In the same paper Kreisel also sketches an "alternative interpretation", which was further developed in [3] and came to be called modified realizability. Kreisel observes that those proof interpretations can be used for proving independence results, and the different versions of the interpretation might provide independence proofs for different principles.
It is normally held that one of the weakenings of Gödel's Dialectica interpretation is that it assumes decidability of prime formulas, known as the contraction problem. This happens because when interpreting e.g. A → A ∧ A the Dialectica interpretation must, in loose terms, pick one counter-example out of two, which can be done by checking which one is indeed a counter-example. It might as well be that both are indeed counter-examples, which implies that the choice at this point is not unique, making the Dialectica interpretation non-canonical (cf. [4] , section 2.3.1). A variant of the Dialectica interpretation in which this problem is circumvented was then suggested in [5] , and is known as the Diller-Nahm variant of Dialectica interpretation. The trick was simply to collect all such counter-examples, postponing the actual decision. In [6] Stein showed that this idea could be generalised, and he defines a family of interpretation, parametrised by the type level from which the counter-examples are collected.
In [7] , Kohlenbach observed that Howard's majorizability relation [8] can be used to define a "monotone" version of the Dialectica interpretation, where majorants, rather than precise witnesses, are obtained from proof. This allows for new (even ineffective) principles to be interpreted, and for a new solution to the contraction problem.
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The goal of this article is to show that all these functional interpretation can be viewed as special cases of a single parametrised interpretation via a careful instantiation of two parameter relations. We are able to prove a single soundness theorem, stating sufficient conditions on the parameter relation for such soundness theorem to hold. We also characterise the interpretation via parametrised logical principle.
Heyting arithmetic in all finite types
The set of finite types T is inductively defined as follows:
The language of IL ω contains variables for all finite types, and constants serving as constructors and destructors on the non-basic types, e.g. two families, for each type σ, len(·) : σ * → o and (·) (·) : σ * × o → σ for the length and lookup of finite sequences of type σ * (respectively). The atomic formulas are simply equalities of basic type s = t and ⊥. Formulas are built out of atomic formulas via the logical constructions ∧, ∨, → and quantifiers ∀x σ and ∃x σ . Negation is defined as ¬A ≡ A →⊥. As for the logical rules, we have chosen to work with a natural deduction system (as shown in Appendix A) for two reasons. Firstly, this will give a better understanding of how each logical construct influences on the interpretation. Secondly, natural deduction systems have not been widely used in the context of proof interpretations, and we try to contra-balance this here.
Heyting arithmetic in all finite types HA ω is an extension of IL ω with constants for zero, successor, higher-order recursion, together with the appropriate quantifier-free axioms, and the induction rule:
Without loss of generality we can assume that the subproofs of A(0) and A(n) → A(n + 1) do not contain undischarged assumptions.
We will assume that higher type equality in HA ω is treated neutrally, as defined in [9] . This means that only equality between objects of basic type is part of the language, and only universal axioms are used. In the soundness proofs, however, we will make use of the rule of extensionality, as used by Spector [10] , which should therefore be added to the verifying system.
Functional Interpretations
Let T ω be an extension of the quantifier-free fragment of HA ω . A functional interpretation of HA ω into T ω consists of two mappings. One formula translation
where x and y are two (possibly empty) disjoint sequences of free-variables of the resulting formula; and a proof translation (also called soundness)
for some formula B such that HA ω B → ∃x∀y|A| x y . We will call standard soundness the proof translation in which B is the formula ∀y|A| t y , for some term t. The sequence of variables x marks the computational information required by the formula, or the constructive content of A. The substitution of a term t for such variable, i.e. |A| x y [t/x] will be denoted by |A| t x . We will call any term t for which ∀y|A| t y holds a witness for A. Moreover, the type of x, which we shall denote by τ A , we call the type of the formula A. The sequence of variables y marks the position of the possible counter-examples for concrete potential witnesses t. Hence, in order to show that t is not a witness for A we just need to produce a sequence of terms s such that ¬|A| t s .
Therefore, the proof translation component of the interpretation gives a way of translating a proof of A into a proof of some formula B which implies the existence of witnesses for A. We want proof interpretations which are also complete in the sense that the existence of witnesses for A also implies back the truth of A, i.e. ∃x∀y|A| x y → A in some reasonable model. The goal of this article is to show that both formula and proof translations can be parametrised, so that instantiations of those parameters will give rise to most of the known functional interpretations. We will start with a parametrisation of the formula translation, and we show that a standard soundness, i.e. proof mapping, can be given by assuming some simple properties of the parameter. We then introduce a second parameter in the proof translation, and show that further restrictions on the second parameter allow us to prove the parametrised proof translation for the parametrised formula translation.
Parametrised Formula Translation
We will give an interpretation of HA ω into a theory T ω , which contains an uninterpreted bounded universal quantifier ∀x < tA(x). This should be viewed as an abbreviation rather than as new formula construct, and the symbol < is merely part of the abbreviation. As we will see, the bounded quantification ∀x < tA(x) will allow us to parametrise the amount of counterexample that becomes witness when interpreting negation (or more generally, when interpreting the premise of an implication). More clearly, we should answer the following question: given the interpretation |A| We can take a less radical position and say that f does not produce counter-examples for A, but just gives a "bound" on those, i.e. By choosing ∀x < tA(x) to be an abbreviation for A(t) we get back Gödel's interpretation of negation |¬A| f x :≡ ¬|A| x f x . On the other hand, if we take ∀x < tA(x) to be an abbreviation for ∀xA(x) instead we have that |¬A| f x :≡ ¬∀y|A| x y , meaning that any term is a witness for a negated statement, provided that ¬∀y|A| x y holds, for all x. This corresponds to the approach taken by modified realizability, which says negated formulas do not ask for any specific witnesses. We will show that with some basic assumptions on the choice of the abbreviation ∀x < tA(x) we can define a parametrised interpretation and prove a general soundness theorem. This implies that instantiations of the abbreviation which satisfy the required assumptions will give rise to different functional interpretations.
Before listing our assumptions on what ∀x < tA(x) can be an abbreviation for, let us define the class of formulas which will be the image of the parametrised formula translation, i.e. for all formulas A, the formula |A| will be in this class. Definition 2 (Parametrised Formula Translation). To each formula A we associate a <-bounded formula |A| 
Recall that x, y, v, w, f and g are sequences of variables. Therefore, if y is the empty sequence we let
We will make use of the following three condition on the choice of what ∀x < tA(x) can be an abbreviation for. Let T ω be an extension 1 of HA ω . For all formulas Γ, A and B (with free variables a) and closed terms p, q, r 0 , r 1 , s, t there must exist closed terms a 1 , a 2 and a 3 such that
Intuitively, a 1 alu produces a bound for u; a 2 aly provides a common bound for r 0 aly and r 1 aly; and a 3 alw gives a bound on the potentially infinite set {w : w < paly(sal)w ∧ y < qal(sal)w}.
It is clear that condition (A3) supersides (A2) when <-bounded quantifiers (i.e. ∀x < tA(x)) can be used to represent standard numeric bounded quantifier (i.e. ∀n ≤ tA(n)). As we will see, however, this is not the case e.g. with the Dialectica interpretation.
We present now a standard proof translation for the parametrised formula translation. This should be viewed as a preparation for the next step: a parametrisation of the proof translation. The following theorem will be shown to be a special case of the parametrised proof translation.
Theorem 1 (Standard Soundness). Assume T
ω is an extension of HA ω for which the (A) conditions hold. If
then there are sequences of closed terms t and r of appropriate types such that
where a is the tuple of free-variables of Γ and A.
Proof. See Appendix B. 2
The notation {Γ } is used in order to distinguish axioms of the theory HA ω from implicative assumptions Γ , which are considered undischarged assumptions. The functional interpretation will provide witnesses for the conclusion and "potential" counter-examples for these assumptions. Of course, one could also view the axioms of HA ω as undischarged assumption, in which case potential counter-example for the axioms will also be provided.
Characterisation
We show now that the following principles are sufficient for proving the equivalence between the truth of A and the existence of witnesses for A. Markov principle for <-bounded formulas
the schema of choice 1 For simplicity we will not go into the details of how much arithmetic the verifying system T ω should contain. It will be clear, however, that for the results presented here T ω could also be a subsystem of HA ω .
and independence of premise for ∀ <-bounded formulas
Theorem 2. For any formula A in the language of HA
Proof. By induction on the logical structure of A. The only non-trivial case is when A has the form A → B, in which case we have:
We show next that by simply instantiating the parameter relation < in the unifying functional interpretation we obtain well-known functional interpretations, both the formula translation and the corresponding standard soundness theorem. In each case we explicitly give the families of terms a 1 , a 2 and a 3 and show that conditions (A1), (A2) and (A3) hold for such choices.
Kreisel's modified realizability
Modified realizability is defined as follows:
Definition 3 (Modified realizability [2, 3] ). For each formula A of HA ω we associate a new formula x mr A (x is a sequence of fresh variable) inductively as follows:
x mr A at :≡ A at , when A at is an atomic formula.
Assume we have already defined x mr A and v mr B, we define
In order to obtain modified realizability from the unifying functional interpretation we take ∀x < r aA(x) to mean ∀xA(x). In such case, the definition of implication
given in Definition 2 when instantiated becomes
Notice that conditions (A1), (A2) and (A3) clearly hold for such choice, no matter what terms a 1 , a 2 and a 3 one chooses.
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Theorem 3. In the Definition 2, let ∀x < r aA(x) be an abbreviation for ∀xA(x). Then for all formulas A in the language of HA Proof. By induction on the logical structure of A. The case in which A is atomic is trivial. For the composite cases, assume x mr A ↔ ∀y|A|
Gödel's functional interpretation
Gödel's functional interpretation (also known as the Dialectica interpretation) is normally defined as follows:
Definition 4 (Dialectica interpretation [1, 11] 
In each case it is hopefully clear what the quantifier-free formula (·) D is. E.g. In the case of disjunction we have (
In order to obtain Gödel's original functional interpretation from the unifying functional interpretation we take ∀x < g tA(x) to mean A(t). In such case, the definition of implication
can again on the meta-level be simplified to
and that is what we use in the following.
Condition (A1) holds by taking a 1 alu := u. The fact that condition (A2) holds now is not as trivial as in the case of modified realizability. Notice that it is enough to produce a term a 2 satisfying
This can be achieved e.g. if for each formula Γ one can produce a term t Γ satisfying
If this is the case the we can define a 2 as a 2 aly := r 0 aly if t Γ al(r 0 aly) = 0 r 1 aly otherwise.
As for condition (A3), we simply take a 3 alw := pal(qal(sal)w)(sal)w. It is easy to see that if 
Diller-Nahm functional interpretation
The Diller-Nahm interpretation is normally presented as a variant of Gödel's Dialectica interpretation where decidability of prime formulas is no longer necessary. The drawback is that instead of producing witnessing terms given a proof of A the Diller-Nahm interpretation only produces a finite collection of candidate witnesses, with the assurance that one of those is indeed a witness.
Definition 5 (Diller-Nahm interpretation [5] ). For each formula A of HA ω we associate a new formula A ∧ of the form ∀x∃yA ∧ , where A ∧ is 0-bounded -i.e. contains only bounded numerical quantifiers, inductively as follows:
∧ :≡ A at , when A at is atomic formula.
Assume we have A ∧ ≡ ∃x∀yA ∧ (x, y) and B ∧ ≡ ∃v∀wB ∧ (v, w), we define
∧ :≡ ∃z, x∀yA ∧ (x, y, z).
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The 
Therefore, the Diller-Nahm interpretation can be viewed as an instantiation of the unifying functional interpretation where ∀x τ < ∧ t τ * A(x) is an abbreviation for ∀x ∈ tA(x).
The term a 1 in condition (A1) can be taken to be a functional which produces a singleton tuple out of a given parameter, i.e. a 1 alu := u . In order to satisfy condition (A2) we need terms a 2 computing the union of two finite multi-sets, which is simply the concatenation of two finite sequences. As for condition (A3), the term a 3 alw can be taken to be the union of the finite multi-sets paly(sal)w, for each y ∈ qal(sal)w, where qal(sal)w are also finite multi-sets.
Stein's family of interpretations
In [6] , a family of interpretation between Diller-Nahm and modified realizability was defined, parametrised by a number n > 0. The parameter n basically dictates the types of the universal quantifiers which are left "untouched" by the interpretations, as done in the definition of modified realizability. Universal quantifiers of type level bigger than n will get pulled out from premises of implications, following the idea of Diller and Nahm interpretation. The interpretation we define below is basically Stein's definition, in the sense that for each formula A, our definition of A n is intuitionistically (but not syntactically) equivalent to his definition.
For the rest of this section we use the following notations: given a tuple of variable x, we will denote by x the sub-tuple containing the variables in x which have type level ≥ n, whereas x denotes the sub-tuple of the variables in x which have type level < n. The actual value of n will be clear from the context. Definition 6 (Stein's family of f.i.'s [6] ). For each positive natural number n, the interpretation of a formula A of HA ω is a new formula A n of the form ∃x∀y∀yA n , where A n contains only universal quantifiers of type level < n, and no existential quantifier. The assignment is done inductively as follows:
n :≡ A at , when A at is an atomic formula.
Assume we have A n ≡ ∃x∀y∀yA n (x, y) and B n ≡ ∃v∀w∀wB n (v, w), we define
n :≡ ∃f, g∀x, w∀x, w(∀i n−1 ∀yA n (x, gxwi, y) → B n (f x, w)), (∀zA(z)) n :≡ ∃f ∀z, y∀z, yA n (f z, y, z), (∃zA(z)) n :≡ ∃z, x∀y∀yA n (x, y, z).
This interpretation can be viewed as a generalization of Diller and Nahm's idea of collecting witnesses into finite sequences. In the case of Stein's family of interpretations, one actually collects families of witnesses, where the indexing i of the family ranges over the pure type (n − 1). Therefore, in the treatment of implication, the resulting value of gxw is actually a function of type (n − 1) → τ . For the sake of simplicity and intuition we write quantifications of the form ∀i n−1 A n (x, gxwi) as ∀y ∈ img(gxw)A n (x, y). We can then more clearly write the treatment of implication as
n :≡ ∃f, g∀x, w∀x, w(∀y ∈ img(gxw)∀yA n (x, y) → B n (f x, w)),
We show now that also Stein's family of interpretations can be obtained via the unifying functional interpretation by defining the following abbreviation
It is again easy to see that this choice complies with conditions (A1) and (A2), all we need is a surjective functional i → i 0 × i 1 of type (n − 1) → (n − 1) × (n − 1). In the case of condition (A3) it is sufficient to produce a term a 3 satisfying ∀y σ < a 3 hzA(y) → ∀x τ < z∀y σ < hxA(y).
The only non-trivial situation is when σ ≥ n and τ < n, i.e. ∀y σ ∈ a 3 hzA(y) → ∀x∀y σ ∈ hxA(y), which stands for (z is not used)
We can then take a 3 hi := hi 0 i 1 using again any surjective functional i → i 0 × i 1 .
Theorem 5. In the Definition 2, let ∀x < n τ aA(x) be an abbreviation as described above. Then for all formulas A (let A n ≡ ∃x∀y∀yA n (x, y)) in the language of HA
Proof. We only present here the case of implication. Assume A n ≡ ∃x∀y∀yA n (x, y) and
Parametrised Proof Translation
We describe now how the Soundness Theorem (Theorem 1) can also be generalised, via a second family of parameter relations ≺. This gives rise to a family of soundness theorems for a family of functional interpretations. We will again only use the relation in the context ∃x ≺ aA(x), so that ≺ does not need to be a relational symbol in the language. We will assume, however, that the abbreviation ∃x ≺ tA(x) must "behave" as an existential quantifier, in the following sense (E1) For all formulas A(x), B(y) and C(x, y), and terms t, s, if
For instance, we can choose ∃x ≺ aA(x) to mean A(a). In fact, this instantiation will give us back Theorem 1 as a special case of our parametrised soundness theorem. We will show, however, that ∃x ≺ tA(x) can also be taken to be ∃x(x ≤ * t ∧ A(x)), where ≤ * is Howard's majorizability relation (see [8] ). This was first observed in [7] , and gives rise to so-called monotone versions of the Dialectica interpretation and modified realizability. As we will see, according to the framework set up in Section 2, these monotone variants are a combination of the standard formula translations with a monotone proof translation.
Besides condition (E1), we will assume also the following on the choice of the abbreviation ∃x ≺ tA(x): 
We will also consider bounded versions of the conditions (A1), (A2) and (A3). For all formulas Γ, A, B and C, and closed terms r 0 , r 1 , s, t, p, q there are closed terms a *
, where t * is the majorizing term for λa, l.tall.
We show that such weakenings together with the two (E) conditions are sufficient for proving the following parametrised version of the Soundness Theorem.
Theorem 6 (Parametrised Soundness). Assume T ω is an extension of HA ω for which the (A) * and (E) conditions hold. If
then there are sequences of closed terms t * and r * of appropriate types such that
, where a is a tuple of free-variables of Γ and A. Recall that we use {Γ } to indicate that the assumptions Γ are being viewed as undischarged assumptions, rather than axioms of the theory, which (could be, but) are not (in general) witnessed.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Notice that the parametrised soundness gives a family of soundness theorems (depending on the choice of ∃x ≺ aA(x)) for the parametrised formula translation (which is parametrised by ∀x < aA(x)). Moreover, observe that in the monotone soundness we do not require terms a 1 , a 2 and a 3 to be part of the language, but only majorizing terms a * 1 , a * 2 and a * 3 for those, according to the choice for ∃x ≺ aA(x). Table 1 summarises how different instantiations of ∀x < tA(x) and ∃x ≺ tA(x) give rise to different functional interpretations.
Instantiating the parametrised soundness
∃x ≤ * aA(x) Monotone realizability For instance, instantiating < with < g and ≺ with ≤ * gives the so-called monotone Dialectica interpretation, whereas taking < to be < r gives the monotone realizability interpretation (cf. [7] ). In the first case, we no longer need characteristic terms a 2 for deciding prime formulas, but only a majorant a * 2 for those, which can be taken to be the constant 1 functional. Moreover, as shown in [7] , ineffective principles such as weak König's lemma, which are not interpretable with the standard soundness theorem, become interpretable under the monotone soundness.
Programs from Proofs
One should notice that the parametrised functional interpretation can be applied directly to analyse proofs, leaving the instantiation to a later stage, once the (parametrised) witnessing term and (parametrised) verifying proof have been obtained. This can be achieved by adding to the language new formulas constructs ∀x < tA(x) and ∃x < tA(x), families of constants a * 1 , a * 2 , a * 3 and axiom schemes corresponding to the conditions (A) and (E). Starting with a proof of A what one obtains is then a proof of ∃f ≺ t∀a, y|A| f a y , for some closed term t. The extracted term t will potentially contain the new constants added, and the proof of |A| t y will potentially make use of the new formula constructs. Extracting the "abstract" witnessing term t allows for a comparison between the terms extracted via different functional interpretation, namely, we know that terms extracted via different interpretations will have the same structure, and will only differ on the choices of a * 1 , a * 2 and a * 3 . This will be clear cut when analysing proofs of theorem whose interpretation do not contain <, e.g. implication-free theorems and theorems in prenex form. For such formulas A the interpretation |A| x y will be syntactically the same, no matter what the choice of the abbreviation ∀x < tA(x), although the extracted term t and the proof of ∃f ≺ t∀a, y|A| x y will possibly change.
Dealing with classical proofs
The difference between the interpretation becomes evident when e.g. dealing with classical logic. After applying the negative translation (for elimination of classical logic) to proofs of theorems ∀x∃yA qf (x, y) one gets a proof of ∀x¬¬∃yA qf (x, y), which is a shorthand for ∀x((∃yA qf (x, y) →⊥) →⊥)).
Via the parametrised f.i. applied to a proof of such theorem one obtains a term t and a proof of ∃f ≺ t∀x¬∀y < f x¬A qf (x, y).
If we instantiate the parametrised interpretation with the Dialectica abbreviation ∀x < g tA(x) we get that t is actually a bound (in the sense of ≺) on the witnessing function for the original theorem. Moreover, if ∃x ≺ sA(x) is chosen to mean A(s), then t is the actual witnessing function for the theorem.
Similarly, instantiating with the Diller-Nahm abbreviation we would get a function which for any x produces a finite tuple of possible witnesses for y. In the case of Stein's abbreviation, e.g. with n bigger than the type level of y, the term t would produce a family (indexed by the pure type n − 1) of possible witnesses for y.
Applying modified realizability directly would simply produce a new proof of ∀x¬¬∃yA qf (x, y), without any extra information on the witnessing function. In such cases we can make use of the A-translation, which transforms proofs of ∀x¬¬∃yA qf (x, y) into proofs of ∀x∃yA qf (x, y) before modified realizability is used.
The logical framework we use is intuitionistic predicate logic in the language of finite types, on top of which we build HA ω . We have opted for the following natural deduction formalism:
In the rule ∀I the variable x must not occur free in (non-discharged) assumptions of the derivation, whereas in the rule ∃E, x must not occur free in assumptions on which B depends, except for A(x). Furthermore ∃E has the restriction that x is not free in B.
We are using the convention that undischarged assumptions are marked by {·}. This is changed into [·] when the assumptions are discharged. Except in the proofs of Theorems 1 and 6 we do not explicitly show undischarged assumptions.
, where q 0 , q 1 , t 0 , t 1 , l 0 and l 1 are appropriate projections. By condition (A2) we have the existence of a closed term a 2 and a derivation of
Conjunction elimination. By induction hypothesis we have closed terms q, t 0 and t 1 and a proof of
. This easily gives a derivation of |Γ → A 0 | qa,t0a v,y0 , where q avy 0 := qavy 0 0 (y 1 is substituted by the constant 0 of appropriate type).
Implication introduction. This is immediately treated by the induction hypothesis.
Implication elimination. Let us look at the following instance of this rule
By induction hypothesis we have closed terms p 1 , p 2 , q, s and t and derivations for , where 0 is the zero functional of appropriate type, and y 1 is a fresh variable. Similarly with the case Γ A 1 .
Disjunction elimination. Let us consider now the rule
Instead of applying the induction hypothesis to the two derivations π 0 : (A 0 B) and π 1 : (A 1 B) we will consider a slight extensions of those, namely
Applying the IH to these extended derivations will give us tuples of closed terms q 0 , q 1 , s 0 and s 1 and derivations of P. Oliva
By the decidability of equality of basic type we get
|A 0 ∨ A 1 → B| q0a,q1a,λn.cond(n,s0a,s1a) x0,x1,n,w .
More generally, if Γ had been used in the sub-proofs π 0 and π 1 then we would actually have
p0a,q0a,q1a,λn.cond(n,s0a,s1a) x0,x1,n,w .
Again by IH, the derivation π 2 is transformed into a proof of
, for some closed terms p 1 , t 0 , t 1 and t. By conditions (A2) and (A3) (similarly to the treatment of →E) we get
Existential introduction. Let us consider the following instance of the rule
By induction hypothesis we get closed terms q and t and a proof of having that R(s, t, 0) = s and R(s, t, n + 1) = t R(s, t, n). Here we have used on more condition on the abbreviation ∀y < q A(y), namely that ∀yA(y) → ∀y < q A(y). where r[f, h] := λn.R(f, h, n). Here we have again used one more condition on the abbreviation ∀y < q A(y), namely that ∀yA(y) → ∀y < q A(y). 2
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By (E1), this gives a derivation of ∃g ≺ q , f i ≺ t i ∀a, v, y i |Γ → A i | ga,fia v,yi , for i ∈ {0, 1}, where q is an appropriate projection of q.
